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Coal and nonmetal mining used about 4.3 billion pounds of explosives and blasting agents 
during 2001 in the United States.  A major part of this consumption was related to surface 
mining.  Mine Safety and Health Administration accident data indicate that flyrock and lack of 
blast area security were the primary causes of blasting-related injuries in surface mining. 
 
Fatal injuries due to lack of blast area security were primarily caused by failure to clear blast area 
or inadequate access control to the blast area.  At a coal mine, a neighbor walked into the blast 
area and was fatally injured.  The blaster could not see the victim entering the blast area from the 
firing station.  In another case, a passenger in a vehicle was fatally injured by flyrock because 
highway traffic was not monitored during the blast.  In another example, a dozer operator entered 
a blast area due to lack of access control.   
 
Several fatalities resulted from using inadequate or no blasting shelter.  A crane operator was 
fatally injured while standing in the open about 120 ft from the blast site.  In another instance, a 
helper, standing about 150 ft away from the edge of a blast, was fatally injured by flyrock.  In a 
limestone mine an equipment operator was fatally injured while guarding access roads in a 
pickup truck. 
 
This paper briefly describes six representative fatalities due to flyrock and lack of blast area 
security in coal and nonmetal mines.   Several mines were visited to collect information relative 
 
 
to working practices aimed at mitigating blasting hazards.  Salient information obtained through 





Explosive and blasting agents are used in mining, quarrying, construction, and other activities 
where rock fragmentation is essential for the success of the project.  About 5.25 billion pounds of 
explosives were used in the United States during 2001.  Out of this, coal and nonmetal mining 
consumed about 4.29 billion pounds [USGS, 2003].  A major part of this consumption was 
related to surface mining.  Although blasting presents numerous hazards, the mining industry 
considers blasting an indispensable element of rock excavation.  Although mechanical 
excavators can be successfully used in topsoil and clay, blasting is considered an inevitable 
technique for excavating hard rock.  Manufacturers and users are consistently trying to enhance 
blasting safety.  The mining industry has improved its blasting safety record during the past five 
years [Rehak et al. 2001].  Flyrock, lack of blast area security, premature blast, misfire, and 
disposal were major causes of blasting-related injuries in surface mines.  Out of these flyrock and 
lack of blast area security accounted for 68% of the injuries [Verakis and Lobb, 2001].  Miners 
and personnel employed by the mining industry still continue to suffer fatal and disabling 
injuries from blasting accidents.   
 
Blasting generally has two purposes: rock fragmentation, and displacement of the broken rock.  
The movement of the blasted rock (also known as muckpile) depends on the shot-design 
parameters, geological conditions, and mining constraints.  In some mining practices, it is 
desirable to throw or cast as much rock as possible to the spoil heap.  Cast blasting has helped 
mine operators uncover mineral deposits at a reduced cost. 
 
Fragmented rock is not expected to travel beyond the limits of the blast area.  All employees 
must be removed to a safe location away from the blast area during shot firing.  If anyone, such 
as the blaster, is required to stay in the blast area, blasting shelters must be used for protection 
from flying debris.  All entrances to the blast area must be securely guarded or barricaded to 
prevent inadvertent entry of employees, visitors, and neighbors.  The blaster determines the 
bounds of the blast area.  The blaster is responsible for complying with safety laws.  Langefors 
and Kishlstrom [1963], Roth [1979], and Persson et al. [1994] have each developed models to 
predict flyrock range.  
 
Flyrock is generally perceived as the rock propelled beyond the blast area.  Institute of Makers of 
Explosives (IME) has defined flyrock as the rock(s) propelled from the blast area by the force of 
an explosion [IME, 1997].  The U. S. Code of Federal Regulations [CFR], Title 30 defines ‘Blast 
Area’ as the area in which concussion (shock wave), flying material, or gases from an explosion 
may cause injury to persons.  The CFR also states that the blast area shall be determined by 
considering the following factors: 
 
•  geology or material to be blasted, 
 
 
•  blast pattern, 
•  burden, depth, diameter, and angle of the holes, 
•  blasting experience of the mine personnel, 
•  delay systems, powder factor, and pounds per delay, 
•  type and amount of explosive material, and 
•  type and amount of stemming. 
 
The above CFR defines ‘Blast Site’ as the area where explosive material is handled during 
loading, including the perimeter formed by the loaded blastholes and 50 feet (15.2 meters) in all 
directions from loaded holes.  A minimum distance of 30 feet (9.1 meters) may replace the 50-
foot (15.2-meter) requirement if the perimeter of loaded holes is demarcated with a barrier.  The 
50-foot (15.2-meter) and alternative 30-foot (9.1-meter) requirements also apply in all directions 
along the full depth of the hole. 
 
The energy released by an explosive charge in a blasthole crushes the rock near the immediate 
vicinity of the blasthole, fractures the rock beyond the crushed zone, generates seismic waves, 
creates airblast, and moves the fractured rock away from the bench.  Any mismatch between the 
distribution of the explosive energy, geomechanical strength of rock mass, and confinement 
creates a potential for flyrock.  Flyrock originates from the vertical highwall face and bench top.  
Schneider [1997] emphasized the role of excessive powder factor, insufficient burden, inaccurate 
timing, ineffective stemming, and overloading a blasthole in flyrock control.  
 
An injury due to flyrock is sustained when it travels beyond the blast area and injures someone. 
Flyrock is generally caused by: 
 
•  insufficient burden, 
•  improper blasthole layout and loading,  
•  anomaly in the geology and rock structure, 
•  insufficient stemming, and 
•  inadequate firing delays. 
 
An injury due to lack of blast area security occurs when a person fails to stay inside a blast 
shelter or in a protected location.  Accidents due to lack of blast area security were caused by:  
 
•  failure to evacuate the blast area by employees and visitors,  
•  failure to understand the instructions of the blaster or supervisor,  
•  inadequate guarding of the access roads leading to the blast area, and  
•  taking shelter at an unsafe location or inside a weak structure. 
 
Six fatalities due to flyrock and lack of blast area security were reported in surface coal mines 
and six in nonmetal mines during the period 1989 to 1999.  Information related to three fatalities 





 CASE STUDIES 
 
Reporting requirements for injuries, illness, 
and workplace exposures are stipulated in 
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act of 1969 and the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Amendments Act of 1977.  
Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA) accident investigation reports 
were used to gather information about most 
of the fatal injuries listed below.  Figure 1 
relates to a fatal injury due to flyrock at a 
limestone mine in Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania [MSHA, 1999b].  Case study 
No. 6 contains information relative to this 
fatal accident. 
 
1.  Coal Mine, Webster County, WV: On August 29, 1989, a drill operator sustained minor 
injuries and a 41-year-old dozer operator was fatally injured by flyrock in a surface coal mine 
[MSHA, 1989].  They were transported by an ambulance to a nearby hospital.  The drill operator 
was treated for minor injuries and released, but the dozer operator was pronounced dead.  The 
dozer operator had 13 years mining experience, including 15 months as a dozer operator.  The 
mine produced about 8,400 tons of coal per day and employed 73 persons on two production 
shifts and a maintenance shift.   
 
A total of 144, 7-7/8-in diameter holes, 19 ft deep, were loaded with emulsion explosive.  Each 
hole contained about 221 lb of explosive.  The blasting crew notified the foreman of an 
impending blast and the foreman cleared all employees from the pit area.  An employee was 
guarding the access road to the pit.  About two minutes before the blast the employee left his 
post and went to the mine office for a brief visit.  No barricade or notice of blasting was posted at 
the entrance to the access road.  In the mean time, the drill operator and the dozer operator, 
unaware of the imminent blasting, entered the pit area in a pickup truck.  Since the blaster’s 
vision was obstructed by a large pile of dirt, he could not see the pickup truck in the pit area.  
Upon firing the shot the dozer operator was fatally injured and the drill operator sustained minor 
injuries.   
 
This incident underscores the importance of blast area security.  Such incidents could be avoided 
by adopting effective blast area security protocol, proper communication, and miner training.    
 
2.  Nonmetal Mine, Luna County, NM: On October 12, 1990, a visitor sustained severe 
injuries and a 32-year-old drill/blast helper was fatally injured by flyrock in a surface silica flux 
mine [MSHA, 1990].  They were transported by an ambulance to a nearby hospital.  The visitor 
was hospitalized for treatment of broken ribs and internal injuries but the drill/blast helper was 
1. Fatal injury due to flyrock at a limestone mine in 
Pennsylvania (Case Study No.6)  
Source: MSHA, 1999b 
 
 
pronounced dead.  The drill/blast helper had three days mining experience.  The visitor wanted to 
take a photograph of the blast. 
 
The mine employed four persons, working one 8-hour shift a day, five days a week. The mine 
produced silica flux for copper smelting.  The ore was mined by drilling and blasting from 
shallow multiple benches.  The mining company used a blasting contractor for loading and firing 
the shots.   
 
The blast round consisted of 49 holes, 3-in diameter, 12 ft deep, on a 6-ft spacing.  Each hole 
was bottom primed with a stick of 60-percent gelatin dynamite taped to detonating cord.  
Another stick of dynamite taped to detonating cord was placed three to four feet below the collar.  
Some of the holes were stemmed with two feet of drill cuttings.  Several holes were completely 
filled with ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO).  A detonating cord trunk line was used to tie each 
hole without any firing delay.  The trunk line was initiated by a cap and fuse assembly.   
 
The visitor and the drill/blast helper were about 150 ft from the edge of the blast.  Upon firing 
the shot, the drill/blast helper was fatally injured.  The investigation report indicated that poor 
blasting practice (such as, overcharging blastholes, lack of stemming, and absence of delays) was 
exhibited during this shot.  This incident signifies the importance of blasting shelters, proper 
blast design, and training of miners.  
 
3.  Coal Mine, Campbell County, TN: On June 4, 1993, a 16-year-old passenger, in a car 
driven by his parent on interstate 75 (I-75), was fatally injured by flyrock originating from an 
overburden blast in a nearby coal mine [Shea and Clark, 1998].  The closest blasthole was within 
75 ft of the Right of Way (RoW) and 225 ft from the I-75 pavement.  
 
Twenty-eight blastholes, in four rows, on an 18- by 18-ft pattern, 7-1/4 in diameter, were loaded 
with ANFO.  Each hole contained 573 lb of explosive charge and was stemmed with 11 ft of drill 
cuttings.  The length of the explosive column in each hole was about 32 ft. Unlike previous 
blasts, explosive charges were not decked during this blast. 
 
This blast was not designed according to the specifications approved in the permit document 
[Shea and Clark, 1998].  Instead of decking explosive charges in two columns and priming 
separately, the entire charge was loaded in one column.  Hole diameter and blast pattern used in 
this blast were also different from the approved plan.  The stemming was insufficient, and the I-
75 traffic was not monitored.  An 8-ft thick layer of clay on the top of the sandstone overburden 
was considered a contributory factor.  
 
4.  Nonmetal Mine, Madison County, IL: On May 23, 1994, a 21-year-old crane operator was 
fatally injured by flyrock that struck him in the back [MSHA, 1994].  He had 1-1/2 months 
mining experience at this mine.  On the day of the accident, the victim helped the blaster in 
stemming the holes, and placing mats over the holes.  He and the blaster then moved to a top 
bench behind the blast and were standing at a distance of about 120 ft from the nearest blasthole.  
 
 
Upon initiation of the blast, one of the holes threw flyrock toward the victim, fatally striking him 
in the back. 
 
This limestone quarry operated in multiple benches.  The quarry was about 160 ft deep and 
accessed by an inclined haul road across the benches.  The haul road extended to the floor of the 
bottom bench. This mine employed 13 persons, working one 9-hour shift a day, five days a 
week. 
 
Forty-one holes, 3-1/2 in diameter, 12 ft deep, were loaded with ANFO.  Each hole contained a 
500-ms down-hole delay. The delay between the adjacent holes was 25 ms.  The bench height 
was 11 ft.  Stemming consisted of 3 ft of crushed limestone.  The stemmed holes were covered 
with blasting mats of 3- by 3-ft size.  Five-gallon pails containing crushed stone were placed 
over the mats for additional protection. 
 
This incident underscores the need to remove all employees from the blast area and to provide 
blasting shelter for employees whose presence is required in the blast area. 
 
5.  Coal Mine, Pike County, KY: On February 15, 1999, a 55-year-old area resident rode an all-
terrain vehicle (ATV) from his residence to an access trail leading to the blast area [MSHA, 
1999a].  He parked his ATV about 100 ft from the edge of the blast area and started walking to 
the blast area.  Shortly after he started walking, a blast was detonated.  Later, his body was found 
close to the perimeter of the blast area. 
 
Mining was conducted on privately-owned land including land owned by the victim.  It was 
reported that the deceased often visited the mine site and some of his visits were unannounced.  
The mine produced about 3,000 tons of coal per day and employed 46 persons on two 8-hour 
shifts.  The mine operated 5 or 6 days a week. 
 
A total of 212 holes, 6-3/4-in diameter, loaded with 13,000 lb of explosive, were detonated.  Of 
these, 164 holes were 13 ft deep, and 48 holes were 23 ft deep.  The blastholes were drilled on a 
13- by 15-ft pattern.  The blast area and the access road leading to the blast area were examined 
about five minutes before the blast.  Guards were not posted at the access road, and the blaster 
did not have a clear view of the access road from the firing station.  A Ford F-250 pickup truck 
was equipped with two electro-mechanical horns, and on the day of the incident only the low-
pitch horn was operational.  The high-pitch horn was found to be disconnected.  The access road 
was in a valley, and probably  the victim could not hear the blast warning signal or ignored the 
signal.  This incident underscores the need for effective blast area security. 
 
6.  Nonmetal Mine, Lancaster County, PA: On December 21, 1999, a 32-year-old equipment 
operator was in a pickup truck while guarding an access road leading to the blast site [MSHA, 
1999b].  The pickup truck was about 800 ft from the blast site.  Flyrock entered the cab through 
the windshield and fatally struck the victim (Figure 1).  The victim had seven years mining 




The mine normally operated two 8-10 hour shifts a day, five days a week, and had 22 employees.  
The mining company used a drilling contractor to drill the holes, and a blasting contractor for 
loading and blasting.  The highwall face was about 50 ft high and the depth of holes ranged 
between 49 and 54 ft.  The blast round consisted of 22 holes drilled on a 16- by 16-ft pattern.  
Approximately 9,595 lb of explosives were used in this round and the length of stemming varied 
from 9 to 36 ft.  The weight of explosive used in each blasthole was not recorded.  Some of the 
holes were slanted up to 25E toward the highwall to compensate for irregularities in the highwall 
face.  The investigation report indicated that at least one of the blastholes blew-out causing a 
massive amount of flyrock.  This incident emphasizes several factors, such as excessive powder 
loading, voids, discontinuities, break in the rock strata, and blasthole inaccuracy. 
 
 
 MINE VISITS 
 
Several surface mines were visited to obtain information relative to blast design, flyrock safety, 
and blast-area-security protocol.  Drilling, loading and blasting operations at several sites were 
observed.  Blasting plans at most of the mines were also examined.  Generally, blasting plans 
addressed safety-related issues pertaining to ground vibration, airblast, flyrock, blast warning, 
and access control, among others. 
 
During the mine visits it was observed that blasts were laid out by the blaster based on the 
blasting plan.  The mitigating techniques to prevent injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast area 
security were generally similar and recognized the importance of proper blast design and local 
geology, and also relied heavily on pre-drilling inspection, driller-blaster communication, pre-
loading inspection, and guarding and access control.  The salient points of observations during 
the mine visits are listed below. 
 
• Blasting plan:   During the mine visits several blasters emphasized the importance of 
following a good blasting plan that optimized the balance between energy distribution, 
energy confinement, and rock properties.  Blasting plans were prepared based on local 
conditions such as geology, rock properties, equipment and explosives used, distance to 
nearest structures, and other environmental constraints.  Proper blast design was the 
single most important tool to prevent blasting problems.  Burden, spacing, hole diameter, 
stemming, subdrilling, initiation system, and type of explosive used matched the 
characteristics of the rock formation.   
 
•  Highwall and bench inspection:  During field visit at a surface mine in Ohio, it was 
noticed that the  blaster was  inspecting the bench top and the highwall face.  The 
highwall was inspected for the presence of cavity, backbreak, overhang, softer strata, slip 
planes, faults, and other geological irregularities.  While the blaster conducted the 
inspection from the quarry floor, a helper on the bench-top used a pole and a tape 
measure to identify the location of trouble spots.  The team was working in unison and all 
 
 
observations were recorded.  It was also noticed during the field visits that blastholes 
were checked for depth, obstruction, and water. 
 
Laser profiling of the highwall face was done at one limestone mine.  The highwall 
profile indicated some areas of excessive burden and other areas of too little burden.  This 
critical information helped the blaster to adjust explosive loading in a blasthole to 
compensate for the variations in the burden. 
 
•  Loading and firing: The driller’s log was examined by the blaster before loading the 
blastholes.  The blastholes were next loaded either by the blaster or under the supervision 
of the blaster.  Before loading began all unnecessary personnel and equipment were 
removed from the blast site.  Generally, the sequence of loading the blastholes matched 
the firing sequence.  The blaster or a helper checked for the rise of explosive column in a 
blasthole during the loading process.  Loading an explosive charge close to the collar 
zone often causes insufficient stemming resulting in bench-top flyrock.  
 
At a surface mine a blasting shelter (Figure 2) was 
readily available for use.  No one was allowed in the 
blast area after blastholes were loaded and lead-in line 
connected.  The blasting shelter was available for the 
blaster to stay inside the blast area during any 
scheduled blasting.  In general, access to the blast area 
was controlled by signs, barricades, and ground 
supervision.  The blaster removed all unused 
explosives, communicated with the guards, and 
visually inspected the bench top prior to firing the 
shot.  Radio communication was used by personnel 
involved in these activities.  
 
•  Post- firing inspection:  The blaster inspected the muckpile and the newly created 
highwall from a safe distance before approaching the area.  If no problems were detected, 
the blaster would then approach the area carefully and examine for any abnormal 
fragmentation, back break, overhang, bootleg, cut-off charge, and misfire.  Upon 
completion of a satisfactory examination, the blaster would then sound an all-clear signal. 
 
• Blasting log:  Before leaving the blast site the blaster completes filling out a ‘blasting 
log’ and signs it affirming that all the information pertaining to the blast has been 
properly documented in the blasting log.  This blasting log becomes an official document 
available for regulatory, legal, and/or public review, if required.  In typical blasting log 
information relative to depth, diameter, burden, stemming, explosive distribution in the 
blastholes, delay sequence, sketch of delay pattern, distance to nearest structure or 
dwelling, seismographic data for ground vibration, and airblast are recorded.  Appendix 
A shows an example of a blasting log. 







•  Lack of blast area security, flyrock, premature blast, misfire, and disposal were major 
causes of blasting-related injuries in surface mines.  Flyrock and lack of blast area 
security accounted for 68% of the injuries.  
 
• Flyrock is caused by a mismatch of the distribution of the explosive energy, 
geomechanical strength of rock mass, and confinement.  Flyrock usually originates from 
the vertical highwall face and bench top.   
 
•  All employees should be removed to a safe location away from the blast area during 
blasting.  If anyone is required to stay in the blast area, blasting shelters must be used. 
 
• All entrances to the blast area should be securely guarded to prevent inadvertent entry 
of employees or visitors.   
 
• Knowledge of local geology and site-specific blasting plan are helpful in reducing 
flyrock injuries. 
 
•  Good communication between the driller, blaster, access control guard, and miners is 
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1. Company Name                                           Permit No.   
2. Location of Blast                                         Date/Time   
3. Nearest Protected Structure   
                                                 Direction and Distance (feet)    
4. Weather Conditions       Dry        Foggy         Clear         Cloudy         Rain         Snow       
5. Type(s) of material blasted              Sandstone            Slate            Shale            Dirt         
6. Mats or other protection used                                                                                                       
7. Type(s) of explosives used:             Powder                          Primers                                     
8. Total weight of explosives used:     Powder                 +  Primers                 =                  lbs. 
9. Blasthole Data:         Number                          Diameter                          Depth                    
   Burden                           Spacing                                              
10.  Stemming Data:       Type of Material    
                                         Length   
11.  Types of Delays used and Delay Period    
12.  Maximum Weight of Explosive Allowed per Delay Period (Show appropriate formula and answer) 
  
  
13.  Maximum Weight of Explosives Used per Delay Period    
14.  Weight of Explosives used per hole    







Sketch of Delay Pattern 
 
24. 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Note:  Show Direction to Nearest Protected Structure on Sketch. 
 
16. Date and Time of Recording    
17. Type of instrument    
18. Sensitivity     
19. Calibration Signal or Certificate of Annual Calibration (Attachment)    
20. Name of Person taking Reading    
21. Location of Seismograph (including distance from blast)    
22. Vibrations Recorded:   Longitudinal:    
                                          Transverse:    
                                          Vertical:    
                                          Vector sum:    
                                          Air Blast:    
23. Name of Person and Firm Analyzing Readings:    
25. Include any special design features, such as decking.  Include reasons and conditions for unscheduled 
blasts. 
Name of Blaster (Print or Type)    
Signature of Blaster    
Certification Number of Blaster    
